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Abstract—To be prepared against cyberattacks, most organi-
zations resort to security information and event management
systems to monitor their infrastructures. These systems depend
on the timeliness and relevance of the latest updates, patches
and threats provided by cyberthreat intelligence feeds. Open
source intelligence platforms, namely social media networks
such as Twitter, are capable of aggregating a vast amount
of cybersecurity-related sources. To process such information
streams, we require scalable and efficient tools capable of identi-
fying and summarizing relevant information for specified assets.
This paper presents the processing pipeline of a novel tool that
uses deep neural networks to process cybersecurity information
received from Twitter. A convolutional neural network identifies
tweets containing security-related information relevant to assets
in an IT infrastructure. Then, a bidirectional long short-term
memory network extracts named entities from these tweets to
form a security alert or to fill an indicator of compromise. The
proposed pipeline achieves an average 94% true positive rate and
91% true negative rate for the classification task and an average
F1-score of 92% for the named entity recognition task, across
three case study infrastructures.
Index Terms—deep neural networks, threat detection, indica-
tors of compromise, Twitter, OSINT
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is becoming an ever-increasing concern for
most organizations, with studies estimating the cost of cy-
bercrime to be up to 0.8 percent of the global GDP [1].
A Security Operations Center (SOC) requires timely and
relevant threat intelligence to accurately and properly monitor,
maintain, and secure an IT infrastructure. This leads security
analysts to strive for threat awareness by collecting and reading
various information feeds. However, if done manually, this
results in a tedious and extensive task that may result in
little knowledge being obtained given the large amounts of
irrelevant information an analyst may have to go through.
Although there is the option of subscribing a paid service to
receive curated feeds, research has shown that Open Source
Intelligence (OSINT) provides useful information to create
Indicators of Compromise (IoC) [2]–[4].
In this paper, we present a threat intelligence tool that
employs deep neural network architectures to process a data
stream, identifying relevant security-related information and
extracting relevant entities, thus synthesizing valuable knowl-
edge that can be used by a SOC.
Although other text-based sources could leverage our ap-
proach, we opted to focus on Twitter due to its ability to act
as a natural aggregator of multiple sources [5]. This social
media platform offers a large and diverse pool of users, high
accessibility, timeliness, thus producing a large volume of
data. These properties remain true regarding the cybersecurity
field [4]. From security researchers, companies and enthusiasts
to hacker groups, there is a rich and timely flow of security-
related data.
The tool proposed in this paper collects tweets from a
selected subset of accounts using the Twitter streaming API,
and then, by using keyword-based filtering, it discards tweets
unrelated to the monitored infrastructure assets. To classify
and extract information from tweets we use a sequence of two
deep neural networks. The first is a binary classifier based
on a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) architecture used
for Natural Language Processing (NLP) [6]. It receives tweets
that may be referencing an asset from the monitored infras-
tructure and labels them as either relevant when the tweets
contain security-related information, or irrelevant otherwise.
Relevant tweets are processed for information extraction by
a Named Entity Recognition (NER) model, implemented as
a Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) neural
network [7]. This network labels each word in a tweet with
one of six entities used to locate relevant information.
We are seeking a complete end-to-end architecture with
no requirement for feature engineering and extra components
in the processing pipeline. Furthermore, we have chosen to
pursue the application of deep learning techniques because
of its advantages in the NLP domain [8]. Thus, we propose
an end-to-end threat intelligence tool which relies on neural
networks with no feature engineering. The pipeline is capable
of receiving tweets relevant to an infrastructure, selecting those
which appear to contain relevant information regarding an
asset’s security and extracting valuable entities which can be
used to issue a security alert or to improve an IoC.
To evaluate our approach we collected tweets correspond-
ing to three IT infrastructures defined by three private or-
ganizations: a nation-wide power utility, a large company’s
cybersecurity consultancy department, and a worldwide travel
services provider. We establish a methodology through which,
according to a defined evaluation metric, we compare several
variations to the deep learning architectures to select a model
which provides the best performance. Furthermore, we com-
pare the proposed models to other well-known classifiers and
provide a detailed analysis of the results obtained.
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The evaluation shows that our approach is capable of
finding, on average, more than 92% of the relevant tweets,
and matching cybersecurity-relevant labels to named entities
within these tweets with an average F1-score above 90%.
Based on the best models obtained in our experiments, we
retrieved tweets where the NER models were capable of
extracting relevant entities and performed a brief analysis
which demonstrates the timeliness of Twitter as a valuable
source for relevant cyberthreat awareness.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review previous work that used Twitter or
other OSINT sources for cybersecurity, and employed machine
learning for cyberthreat detection. Additionally, we review
previous research on deep learning techniques to process
tweets and perform NER or other NLP tasks.
A. Machine learning and OSINT for cyberthreat detection
Previous work has explored the possibility of using Twitter
as an information source for cyberthreat awareness. Le Sceller
et al. [2] proposed SONAR, an automatic keyword-centric self-
learned framework that can detect, geolocate and categorize
cybersecurity events in near real-time, based on a Twitter
stream. The authors describe the framework in three phases.
The first is similar to ours, as the framework queries Twitter
with a list of keywords to retrieve a continuous stream of
tweets. However, instead of querying Twitter as a whole,
we focus on a pre-defined set of accounts that are more
likely to tweet security-related content, thus avoiding possible
performance decrease due to noisy content. Moreover, the
keywords we use are not cyberthreat related (e.g., attacks
and vulnerabilities). Instead, we query for a list of keywords
that define the assets in the monitored infrastructure. The
second phase of SONAR is about event detection. A clustering
technique is used to aggregate similar tweets that may report
the same cybersecurity event. Given that the system relies on
keywords being up-to-date, the third phase aims to find new
keywords based on their co-occurrence with other previously
defined tweets. These two phases differ from ours in scope,
since our aim is not to build a general information security
news feed but rather a tool to gather the most recent informa-
tion related to the security of a pre-defined list of assets.
Sabottke et al. [4] proposed a Twitter-based exploit detector
using an SVM classifier. The detector is capable of extracting
vulnerability-related information from Twitter, augment it with
additional sources and predict if the vulnerability is exploitable
in a real-world scenario. An interesting feature from this work
is the consideration of adversarial interference to deceive the
classifier. These adversaries vary in their knowledge of the
classifier and in the complexity of their poison-attacks that
attempt to deceive the classifier. Currently, our system uses
sets of pre-defined user accounts based on the likelihood that
they tweet about the security of the protected IT infrastructure.
Regarding IoC extraction from OSINT, Liao et al. [3]
developed iACE, an automated tool capable of IoC extraction.
It extracts information from technical articles, which tend to
Fig. 1. Twitter threat detection pipeline.
provide information in a more structured and formal manner
when compared to Twitter. The authors take advantage of some
properties of these articles, such as a set of context terms
and their grammatical relations. Unlike iACE, our approach
aims to explore the use of deep learning techniques to extract
grammatical relations automatically, removing the necessity
for manual feature engineering.
Concurrently with this work, Zhou et al. [9] employed
a NER architecture for extracting IoC from cybersecurity
reports. Differently from our architecture, their proposal in-
tegrates manually engineered features and an attention mech-
anism with the BiLSTM.
B. Deep learning for tweet analysis
Using a similar architecture to the one we use, Severyn et
al. [10] perform sentiment analysis on Twitter data taken from
the SemEval 2015 Twitter Sentiment Analysis challenge. In
comparison to other systems submitted to the challenge, their
solution ranked in the two first positions in both tasks.
Badjatiya et al. [11] experimented with several classifiers
including, but not limited to, deep learning methods to detect
hate speech in tweets. The authors report that deep learning
techniques perform significantly better than other methods.
Regarding applications of deep learning for NER tasks
using Twitter data, Jimeno-Yepes et al. [12] implemented a
sequence-to-sequence LSTM architecture for the annotation
of medical entities to support public health surveillance. The
architecture presented outperforms the previous state-of-the-
art. Regarding future work, the authors plan on using the
architecture proposed by Lample et al. [7], which is the one
in which we have based our NER approach.
III. TOOL ARCHITECTURE
Our tool follows the high-level three-stage pipeline archi-
tecture depicted in Figure 1 to process data from Twitter
and extract relevant cybersecurity information. The first stage
collects tweets through the Twitter API, filters them based on
a set of keywords and normalizes tweets to a specific format.
In the second stage, a binary classifier labels tweets as either
relevant, meaning the tweets are likely to contain valuable
information about an asset, or irrelevant otherwise. Finally, in
the information extraction stage, relevant tweets are processed
by an NER network. The information extracted can be used
to issue a security alert or to enrich an existing IoC in a
threat intelligence platform such as MISP [13]. The following
sections describe the three stages.
A. Data collection
The data collection stage comprises the execution of three
tasks: data collection, keyword-based pre-filtering, and text
pre-processing.
1) Collector: The collector requires a set of Twitter ac-
counts from which it will query the Twitter’s streaming API.
These accounts can be from companies, security vendors,
hacker groups, security analysts, and researchers. Ideally,
they are chosen based on their likelihood of tweeting about
components present in the monitored IT infrastructure. This
approach of retrieving tweets from a specific set of accounts
can drastically reduce the amount of irrelevant information that
is gathered by the collector.
2) Filter: By assuming that a tweet about an infrastructure
asset has to mention its properties and components, the filter
module employs a set of user-defined keywords describing
the infrastructure being monitored to drop irrelevant tweets,
thus further decreasing the amount of information that flows
through the pipeline. For instance, if an analyst desires to
be informed about potential threats to a web service hosted
on a cloud platform, the set of keywords should include
operating systems, the cloud platform being used and all other
components supporting the asset in question.
3) Pre-processing: At the end of the data collection stage,
a pre-processing module transforms tweets that passed the
filter, making their representation uniform before subsequent
processing by the classifier and NER modules. Characters are
converted to lower-case, and hyperlinks and special characters
are removed, except for ‘.’, ‘-’, ‘_’, and ‘:’, as they are often
used in IDs, version numbers, or component names.
B. Classification
The classification stage aims to detect tweets that contain
security-related information so that only these will proceed
to the Named Entity Recognition (NER) stage. To perform
this task, we implemented a binary classifier using a CNN [6]
whose architecture can be described by five layers: input,
embedding, convolution, max-over-time-pooling, and output.
Figure 2 shows this architecture.
1) Input layer: The CNN receives a sentence represented
by a sequence of n integers, each representing a word token,
just as shown in Figure 2.
2) Embedding layer: Each integer corresponds to a d-
dimensional numeric vector representing the semantic value
of the corresponding word. These word vectors can be ran-
domly initialized or extracted from previously trained language
models (e.g., GloVE [14] or Word2Vec [15]) providing a
starting point for the semantic value. In both cases, the learning
algorithm may further adjust the word vector. As a result of
this layer, we have an n× d sentence embedding matrix S.
3) Convolution layer: With a set of k learnable kernels,
each containing f filters with height h and width d, the
convolution operation will slide down these kernels over the
embedded matrix S, producing k×f feature maps. The height
and width of the filters correspond to the number of words
covered and to the dimension of the word vectors, respectively.
Fig. 2. Convolutional Neural Network architecture for sentence classification.
As the filter slides down the matrix, the resulting feature map
will have a length of n − h + 1, where n is the number of
words in the sentence.
A single feature ci, produced by filter W , is computed as,
ci = σ(W  Si:i+h−1 + b) , (1)
where σ is a non-linear function,  denotes the Hadamard
product, b is a bias term, and Si:i+h−1 denotes a sub-matrix
from S by taking rows i to i+h−1. Given that this operation
computes one feature for each stride of the filter over the
embedded matrix, the convolutional layer outputs a set of k×f
feature map vectors, each containing n− h+ 1 features.
4) Max-over-time-pooling layer: Intuitively, if one feature
map results from sliding a filter over the embedding matrix,
the feature values composing that map denote how strong the
feature is within a specific input window. We reduce such
feature map into a single value providing information about
the presence or absence of a feature, through the max-pooling
operation [16]. In the end, this layer helps to filter redundant
information, thus preventing overfitting and decreasing the
computational burden. As each feature map gets reduced to
a single value, this layer outputs a k × f feature vector.
5) Output layer: Before using the selected features in the
output layer of the network, dropout [17] is applied to the
feature vector. This procedure sets a proportion of the feature
vector elements to zero, preventing gradients to propagate
through these elements and co-adapting the nodes. Dropout
acts as a form of regularization [18], preventing overfitting and
promoting generalization. Finally, feature nodes are used by a
fully-connected softmax layer which outputs the probability of
a tweet to contain relevant information. If relevant, the tweet
moves to the next stage of the pipeline, otherwise it is dropped.
C. Named entity recognition
In the NER phase, we aim to extract information from
tweets that have been considered relevant by the classifier.
We have based our model on a BiLSTM neural network [7].
Figure 3 depicts its architecture.
Fig. 3. Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory architecture for named entity
recognition.
This network locates and labels valuable security-related
entities such as monitored infrastructure assets, vulnerabilities,
attacks, and vulnerability repository IDs mentioned in tweets.
To the extent possible, we defined security-related entities
according to descriptions from the ENISA risk management
glossary [19]. In the following, we briefly describe the network
layers: input, embedding, word-level BiLSTM, tweet-level
BiLSTM, and output.
1) Input layer: In addition to the n integers representing
the word tokens applied to the input layer of the classifier, this
network receives secondary sequences of nc integers, one for
each word at the input. Each secondary sequence represents
the characters that form a word token. These sequences allow
the network to be less constrained by the vocabulary used
during training.
2) Embedding layer: This layer’s functionality is similar
to the classifier’s regarding the sequence of n integers that
correspond to the words in tweets. These are converted to a
dw-dimensional numeric vector, thus providing a word-level
semantic representation of the tweet. This results in an n×dw
matrix representation where n is the number of words and dw
is the length of the embedded word vectors.
Additionally, the nc integers in each secondary sequence
are converted to dc-dimensional numeric vectors, providing a
character-level representation of the tweet. Therefore, besides
the word-level embedded matrix, each word has a correspond-
ing c×dc character-level matrix representation, where c is the
number of characters in a word and dc is the length of the
embedded character vectors.
3) Word-level BiLSTM layer: The embedded character ma-
trix corresponding to each word is fed to a BiLSTM network,
containing two cells that read the sequence of input character
vectors in opposite directions. Both cells possess an hc-
dimensional vector hidden state, that is updated at every
time step (i.e., at every character read). After reading all the
characters in the embedded character matrix, the cell states are
extracted and concatenated. These vectors hold a character-
level representation from both left-to-right and right-to-left
readings.
As a result, this layer generates an n×(2×hc) state matrix,
for concatenation with the word-level embedding matrix.
4) Tweet-level BiLSTM layer: At this stage we have a
matrix of n words, each word represented by a numeric vector
with dimension dw + (2× hc).
Similar to the process described for the word-level BiLSTM,
we feed this tweet representation to another BiLSTM layer,
word by word. However, while in the previous layer we only
retrieve the final hidden state, in this layer we read it at every
timestep (every word representation read).
Thus, the output of this layer is an n×ht matrix, where ht
is the length of the BiLSTM’s cell state vector.
5) Output layer: In the final layer of the NER model, we
have a fully-connected neural network and a Conditional Ran-
dom Fields (CRF) module [20]. The fully-connected neural
network contains m neurons, m being the number of possible
labels that the model can predict. As an input to this layer,
we have the n × ht matrix provided by the previous layer,
therefore creating an n × m output matrix. This matrix can
be thought as a score matrix, where the activations of the m
neurons produce a score for each label.
Then, this scoring matrix is used to compute the final
sequence of labels. Instead of choosing the highest label score
for each word, thus modeling labeling decisions independently,
the CRF module allows to model them jointly. Given a
sequence of words and corresponding score vectors, and can-
didate label sequences, a linear-chain CRF computes a single
score for each candidate sequence of labels. By selecting
the highest single score, this layer outputs the corresponding
candidate sequence of n labels that match the input sequence
of n words at the input layer.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section describes the experimental work conducted to
design both the classification and NER neural networks. Addi-
tionally, we describe the approach employed to obtain results
for other state-of-the-art or well-established methodologies, for
comparison purposes.
A. Datasets
To build our system, we continuously collect tweets from
two sets of accounts, denoted S1 and S2. The tweets are related
to IT infrastructures specified by three private organizations:
a worldwide travel services provider, a global-company cy-
bersecurity department, and a nation-wide power utility. Each
of the three infrastructures denoted A, B, and C, is defined
by a set of assets, which in turn are specified by a variable
number of keywords. For a subset of tweets collected over
four-months, tweets were analyzed and labelled relevant (or
not) for the security of the designated assets.1
Each infrastructure dataset was split and organized into three
subset groups, as described in Table I, one for training the
models (A1, B1, C1), another for validation (A2, B2, C2) and
the remaining one for testing (A3, B3, C3).
1https://github.com/ndionysus/twitter-cyberthreat-detection
TABLE I
DATASETS CORRESPONDING TO COMPANIES A, B AND C.
Datasets Time Interval Accounts Positives Negatives Total
A1 21/11/2016
to
27/01/2017 S1
1074 694 1768
B1 1201 638 1839
C1 1293 1473 2766
A2 27/01/2017
to
27/02/2017
282 767 1049
B2 387 671 1058
C2 325 592 917
A3 27/02/2017
to
27/03/2017
S1 + S2
219 313 532
B3 250 247 497
C3 289 358 647
TABLE II
NAMED ENTITIES TO BE EXTRACTED FROM A TWEET.
Label Description
O Does not contain useful information.
ORG Company or organization.
PRO A product or asset.
VER A version number, possibly from the identified asset or product.
VUL May be referencing the existence of a threat or a vulnerability.
ID An identifier, either from a public repository such as the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21], or from an update or patch.
The validation subset is distinguished solely by the time
interval, being collected one month after the training subset.
More importantly, the testing subset is distinguished from the
others not only by the time interval but also because it includes
tweets from an additional set of accounts. We have chosen this
strategy so that the models’ performance and generalization
capability assessment considers both tweets in the future of
training data and a combination of that with previously unseen
Twitter accounts.
Table II displays the labels considered for the NER task.
Although we defined the entities considering descriptions from
the ENISA risk management glossary [19], we adopted broad
definitions, so that the labels become more distinguishable
by the network. For example, the label VUL includes both
vulnerabilities and threats. The reason for this is twofold. On
the one hand, we have limited data for training. Thus, more
specific entity definitions could result in too few instances in
the datasets. On the other hand, as Twitter is an informal
OSINT source, many users of interest do not follow any
international standard when referring to security matters. Once
more data is available and labeled, the number of entities could
be extended, allowing for a more accurate taxonomy.
B. Training and evaluation methodology
To compare the deep-learning neural network classifier
methodology described in previous sections we used a linear
approach, the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [22], and a non-
linear one, the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [23], [24].
The described deep-learning NER methodology was com-
pared to the Stanford CRF NER approach [25], trained with
the procedure and parameters suggested by the authors.
The two deep architecture models described in previous
sections were implemented using TensorFlow [26]. Training
was conducted with the TensorFlow implementation of the
Adam optimizer [27] using the default parameters. The
procedure was executed for 100 epochs with a batch size
of 256, using the validation dataset for early stopping. The
SVM and MLP models were implemented using the Apache
Spark Machine Learning library [28]. Training was carried
out using the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) [29] opti-
mizer for the SVM model, and the Limited-memory Broy-
den–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (L-BFGS) [30] optimizer for
the MLP. In both cases, most parameters have been kept equal
to the package defaults, except those considered in a grid
search executed to select appropriate models. For the SVM,
100 iterations were employed, whereas 200 were used for the
MLP.
As a grid search was used to select appropriate hyper-
parameter values and design variables settings for these mod-
els, in all cases a 10-fold cross-validation methodology was
employed. The 10-fold results were averaged and used to
select the best models and variants for comparison. Regarding
the classification task, besides using the CNN described, we
also adapted the BiLSTM architecture for classification. The
adaptation consists of removing the CRF layer, using only the
last state of both LSTMs, and having only two neurons at the
output for binary classification.
Having picked the best configuration of each model type
and variants for each infrastructure, we train the models with
the full training set, using the validation sets for early stopping,
and then test on the testing sets (A3, B3, and C3).
Next, we describe the grid search procedure executed,
highlighting the hyper-parameter values and design variable
settings considered.
C. Model optimization using grid search
1) Embedding Vectors and BiLSTM hidden states: Re-
garding the initialization of the embedding vectors of deep
neural architectures, we tested randomly initialized embed-
ding, GloVE pre-trained embedding [14], and Word2vec pre-
trained embedding [15]. For the random initialization case,
we tested with vector dimensions of 100, 200, and 300. The
vector dimension applied in pre-trained embedding approaches
was 300. Regarding the NER BiLSTM approach, character
embedding was done only using random initialization with
vector dimension varied within {25, 50, 100}.
For the NER model, the sizes of both state vectors varied
within the same alternatives as the randomly initialized em-
bedding vectors.
2) CNN Convolutional layer: In the convolutional layer of
the CNN, we varied the kernels in number, height, and number
of filters, int the following way:
• Number of kernels: varied between 3 and 6;
• Kernel heights: varied incrementally according to the
number of kernels, either in a sequential manner (e.g.
2,3,4) or by parity (e.g., 3,5,7, or 2,4,6);
• Number of filters: varied within {64, 128, 192, 256};
TABLE III
BINARY CLASSIFIER RESULTS ACROSS ALL INFRASTRUCTURES.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3
TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR TPR TNR
SVM 0.953 0.970 0.915 0.866 0.785 0.831 0.977 0.943 0.995 0.450 0.996 0.575 0.968 0.972 0.951 0.586 0.989 0.555
MLP 0.976 0.987 0.867 0.951 0.739 0.926 0.992 0.977 0.858 0.910 0.818 0.882 0.993 0.992 0.843 0.878 0.888 0.862
CNN + Random 0.988 0.995 0.916 0.904 0.810 0.886 0.998 0.992 0.918 0.891 0.925 0.890 0.989 0.995 0.873 0.871 0.954 0.901
CNN + GloVE 0.979 0.979 0.936 0.919 0.839 0.901 0.993 0.995 0.959 0.930 0.956 0.927 0.993 0.993 0.890 0.864 0.966 0.904
CNN + Word2Vec 0.998 0.999 0.943 0.932 0.849 0.927 0.994 0.979 0.949 0.911 0.947 0.915 0.995 0.999 0.917 0.875 0.958 0.911
BiLSTM + Random 0.999 0.971 0.915 0.906 0.913 0.904 0.978 0.978 0.920 0.949 0.912 0.964 0.990 0.932 0.865 0.872 0.938 0.911
BiLSTM + GloVE 0.986 0.979 0.897 0.940 0.863 0.946 0.973 0.983 0.951 0.918 0.936 0.943 0.985 0.975 0.874 0.870 0.955 0.911
BiLSTM + Word2Vec 0.995 0.995 0.901 0.897 0.890 0.911 0.977 0.985 0.907 0.951 0.912 0.951 0.997 0.989 0.880 0.872 0.934 0.919
3) Dropout regularization: Considering the CNN classifica-
tion model, the dropout rate varied within {0.3, 0.5, 0.6}. The
NER BiLSTM models used two dropout layers, the first after
the word-level BiLSTM and the second after the sentence-level
BiLSTM. We considered only two settings: no dropout or 0.5
dropout probability, which resulted in four possible variants.
4) SVM and MLP models: The SVM and MLP classifiers
use the Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF) approach to obtain a numeric representation of
tweets. The TF-IDF feature vector size was varied within the
set: {30, 50, 80, 100, 200, 300, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 3000}.
For the SVM, the regularization parameter C was varied
within {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5}, while the SGD
step size was varied within {0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 5}. Regarding
the MLP, the number of layers varied from 2 to 8 and the
number of neurons within {5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20}.
V. RESULTS
Regarding the tweet classification models, we used the True
Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR) metrics
for evaluation, as these carry useful information for SOC
analysts. For the NER task, the models were evaluated using
the precision, recall, and F1 metrics.
The results presented shows the best model found in the
grid search executed for each model type and variant. In the
classification task, we consider best the model whose (TPR,
TNR) is closest in the Euclidean sense to the (1, 1) ideal result.
For NER, we adopted the best F1-score to find the best model.
A. Tweet classification
Table III summarizes the results obtained by the different
classification models tested, highlighting the different word
embedding approaches. The result pairs in boldface denote
the best compromise between TPR and TNR in each dataset.
The results indicate that across the three infrastructures the
CNN achieves the best overall results and pre-trained embed-
ding vectors are preferable to randomly initialized ones. The
exception occurs in infrastructure A testing set, in which case
a BiLSTM model with randomly initialized embedding vectors
achieved the best result. Well-established techniques such as
SVMs or MLPs produced worse results, being incapable of
achieving a good balance over TPR and TNR in several
cases. Using frequency-based features instead of semantic
word vectors may have influenced the results obtained. We
TABLE IV
ARCHITECTURES OF THE BEST PERFORMING MODELS FOR EACH DATASET.
Dataset Kernels Number of Filters Dropout Rate
A [3,5,7] 128 0.5
B [3,5,7] 256 0.5
C [3,5,7,9] 256 0.5
tested both SVM and MLP models with concatenated pre-
trained word-vector inputs. However, this approach offered
poor results, therefore it was not further explored. Regarding
generalization, we observe that the performance degradation
is small, leaving the results comfortably above 90% in most
cases. Importantly, we conclude that there is no significant
performance degradation resulting from the addition of tweets
from a second set of accounts in the testing sets.
Focusing on the CNN results, Table IV displays the best
configurations that resulted from the grid search for each
infrastructure. The results favour models with a small number
of kernels with oddly spaced heights ([3, 5, 7] means three
filters with heights 3, 5, and 7), a large number of filters and
0.5 dropout probability.
B. Named entity recognition
Table V displays the best performing models, including the
results obtained by the Stanford CRF NER approach.
In comparison to the Stanford CRF, in general, the BiLSTM
architectures achieved better results across all infrastructures.
The exception is the Precision metric achieved in datasets A2
and C2, where the Stanford CRF showed equal performance.
In general, BiLSTM networks correctly detect the target
entities in more than 90% of the cases.
Except for infrastructure A, the use of pre-trained em-
bedding word vectors provided a slight gain. However, the
improvement is not significant enough to provide a definitive
conclusion. Unlike in the tweet classification task, where both
security-related and non-security-related tweets are present, in
the NER task, only the former is present. Thus, the advantage
of using pre-trained embedding vectors based on non-security
related text may not be as pronounced.
Although in infrastructures A and C the best models ob-
tained the highest F1-score in both validation and testing sets,
in the case of infrastructure B a model different from the best
performing model of the validation set obtained a better F1-
score. However, the difference between these is negligible.
TABLE V
NER F1-SCORE RESULTS ACROSS ALL INFRASTRUCTURES.
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3
Stanford CRF 1.000 0.917 0.852 0.999 0.879 0.810 0.999 0.899 0.906
BiLSTM + Random 0.999 0.932 0.906 0.999 0.919 0.882 0.987 0.925 0.928
BiLSTM + GloVE 0.999 0.926 0.894 0.997 0.932 0.888 0.998 0.924 0.932
BiLSTM + Word2Vec 1.000 0.893 0.864 0.998 0.927 0.890 0.984 0.928 0.934
TABLE VI
VULNERABILITIES PUBLISHED ON TWITTER PRIOR TO BEING DISCLOSED IN NVD
NVD date Tweet date Tweet CVSS
A2 06/02/2017 31/01/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Linux Kernel
ID
CVE-2017-5546
VUL
Local Denial of Service Vulnerability https://t.co/bLEJIb1ZVD 7.8
A3
08/06/2017 27/03/2017
PRO
VMware Player
VER
12.x &lt 12.5.4Drag-and-Drop Feature Guest-to-Host
VUL
Code Execution
ID
(VMSA-2017-0005)
PRO
(Linux)https://t.co/xMIP5JlvOZ 9.9
27/03/2017 24/03/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Broadcom
ID
BCM4339 SoC
ID
CVE-2017-6957
VUL
Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability https://t.co/vR6EznOsBi 8.1
B2 20/03/2017 29/01/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Apache Tomcat
ID
CVE-2016-6816
VUL
Security Bypass Vulnerability https://t.co/PfOdfDGIfy 7.1
B3
27/07/2018 01/03/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Red Hat CloudForms Management Engine
ID
CVE-2017-2632
VUL
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability https://t.co/Vm0fMMM1Rc 4.9
20/03/2017 16/03/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Apache Tomcat
ID
CVE-2016-6816
VUL
Security Bypass Vulnerability https://t.co/FK5nXKcfy8 #bugtraq 7.1
C2
16/03/2017 06/02/2017 #Vuln:
ORG
#Microsoft
PRO
#Windows
ID
CVE-2017-0016
VUL
Memory Corruption Vulnerability https://t.co/ZR3DVVgx3j #bugtraq 5.9
15/02/2017 14/02/2017
ID
ZDI-17-109 :
PRO
Adobe Flash Player MessageChannel
VUL
Type Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability https://t.co/hTaiCS671W 8.8
C3
27/07/2018 01/03/2017 Vuln:
PRO
Red Hat CloudForms Management Engine
ID
CVE-2017-2632
VUL
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability https://t.co/Vm0fMMM1Rc 4.9
11/06/2018 08/03/2017 #Vuln:
ORG
#Mozilla
PRO
#Firefox
ID
MFSA 2017-05
VUL
Multiple Security Vulnerabilities https://t.co/POFeaWjREj #bugtraq 7.5
Thus, the choice of the best model may depend on favoring the
testing set F1-score over the validation sets’ or on considering
an average of both preferable to make the decision.
Regarding the dimension of the character embedding vector
and the character-level hidden state of BiLSTM networks,
the best performing models favored (8 out of 9) the highest
available value of 100. For the word-level hidden state vector
dimension, most models (8 out of 9) used the smallest avail-
able value of 100. Finally, regarding the dropout layers, no
clear trend could be observed in the results.
VI. ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Regarding the applicability of Twitter for cyberthreat aware-
ness, we analyzed the tweets labeled relevant by the classifier
in the validation and testing sets. By using the ID label, we
analyzed the corresponding NVD vulnerability entry to verify
the existence of tweets mentioning these vulnerabilities priorly
to the disclosure date, and to find their severity according to
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [31].
A sample of such tweets found is displayed in Table VI.
Each entry shows the tweet date and the NVD disclosure date,
the tweet with the labels identified by the NER model, and the
CVSS score. The number of days since tweet publication to
NVD disclosure ranged from 1 to 148, clearly showing the
timeliness with which the deep neural network-based OSINT
processing pipeline can provide vulnerability information to
organizations’ SOCs. The tweets CVSS score range from a
medium 4.9 score to a 9.9 critical score, thus showing the
relevance of the information found.
The BiLSTM NER model recognized the most important
aspects of these tweets, such as the infrastructure asset, the
vulnerability, and useful identifiers such as the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). These identified entities
could then have been used to issue a security warning or to
fill an IoC in a threat sharing platform.
Although our current datasets are not large, the results ob-
tained and the information relevance and timeliness justify the
possibility of using Twitter as an OSINT source for cyberthreat
discovery. Furthermore, even though we did not identify one
case in the datasets used where the tweet references a zero-day
exploit without mentioning a CVE or similar identifier, such
was the case in late August of 2018. A Twitter user made
public a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Windows’ task
scheduler, providing a proof-of-concept exploit.2 We sent the
original tweet through our pipeline and the classifier and NER
models correctly labeled the tweet as relevant and identified
the asset in question to be Microsoft Windows. The exploit was
officially made public only on the 9th of September, regardless
of the original tweet appearance on the 24th of August.3
Thus, by combining the timeliness of the Twitter informa-
tion stream with the ability of deep neural architectures to
accurately detect relevant tweets and identify useful pieces of
information therein, OSINT-based threat intelligence platforms
can improve significantly from the current state-of-art, to
provide targeted, timely, and relevant threat intelligence.
2https://www.zdnet.com/article/windows-zero-day-vulnerability-disclosed-
through-twitter/
3https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-
2018-8440
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes deep neural network architectures to
implement the core tasks of a processing pipeline to ob-
tain timely, relevant and targeted security-related information
from Twitter. The proposed system is capable of gathering
tweets from a set of accounts, filtering them based on a set
of keywords defining an infrastructure to monitor, selecting
the tweets containing relevant information, and identifying
useful pieces of information in these tweets. For that, we
implemented convolutional and bidirectional long short-term
memory neural networks. We compare the performance of the
proposed approach to well-established methodologies, veri-
fying that the deep neural network architectures outperform
those methodologies. Three case studies specified by one
nation-wide and two world-wide private organizations were
used to validate the approach. Across the three case studies,
the convolutional neural network binary classifier achieved
an average TPR and TNR of 92%, while the named entity
recognition BiLSTM model achieved an average F1-score of
92% in detecting specified labels.
Future research will focus on exploring multi-task learning
architectures to shape our pipeline into a fully end-to-end
neural network and to evaluate its impact on the models’
performance and on the requirements for pipeline adaptation
over time.
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